30 Nov 2011 Rajoy, tornar a 1979
At a recent dinner party with journalists from Barcelona with a common interest in public affairs, somebody asked me how I thought Mariano Rajoy was going to rule. After all, we know little more of him than his heavy silences. Taking all necessary precautions and without trying to act as a futurologist, I replied that as a president the leader of the People’s Party will work hard not to resemble president Zapatero in the slightest and, above all, will try and make sure nobody mistakes him for president Aznar – the man who appointed him. An alliance between staunch, resentful Aznar supporters and the most ferociously entrenched right-wing Spanish media did indeed everything in its power to cause Rajoy to crash. The Galician, however, has made it to the finish line and – by virtue of the rules of the tournament – this bestows upon him more authority than it may seem within the conservative ranks.
Mr Aznar was a right-wing Leninist (advised by some leftist ideologists who had changed sides) who clearly wished to transform the Spanish reality at top speed and an ambition which he hoped would be of historic proportions. This led him, for example, to take part in the Iraq war with the intention of forcing a geopolitical change which would put an end to Madrid’s dependence on French and German criteria – a dependence which had existed since Franco’s death. During his first term in office, Aznar governed thanks only to the support of Catalan president Jordi Pujol and did so with purely tactical moderation: a centrism represented by minister Josep Piqué and which brought so much joy to the Catalan economic elites, gullible or forgetful to unimaginable extent. Yet from the year 2000 an absolute majority allowed Aznar to remove his mask and show his real face: a wild idealist willing to see his maximum programme through to its bitter end.
I would stake my life on the fact that Rajoy is not remotely interested in transforming reality in order to enter the history books. Unlike former president González, Pujol or Aznar -each in their own way – Rajoy does not seem to perceive government as a tool for social redesign but as an instrument of management which, by stressing certain policies, could allow him to keep plodding on in the predefined direction without any hiccups. I am not implying that Rajoy does not have an ideology. But he will be more pragmatic and patient than Aznar as well as more cunning – albeit not softer – when it comes to using the leverage provided by his absolute majority. I repeat: today’s People Party does have a project and in order to implement it the party could be cleverer than with Aznar and, therefore, more dangerous for the opposition. I have listened to one of Mariano Rajoy’s ideological right-hand men, José María Lassalle, and I can testify that the president knows very well what type of Spain he wants and how to achieve it.
The new Spanish president has been unfortunate to land on La Moncloa in the midst of the worst economic crisis for several decades and will have to work in a rapidly changing environment. The constant frights in the eurozone and the change in the concept of sovereignty within the EU are not issues which can be approached with a relaxed attitude. Now Rajoy seems to want to go back to the 1979 style of the centre-right party Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD). Back then, Adolfo Suárez ruled and the organisation’s internal self-destructive instincts were still kept at bay. “Centrism”, “reformism”, “political pactism”, “dialogue” and “moderation” are some of the buzzwords included in Rajoy’s most recent speeches and which carry one back to the times of the UCD.
I remember that, when Josep Piqué was one of Mr Aznar’s ministers, some of his discourse referred to the need to go back to the spirit of 1977, when democracy was brand-new. His position had two objectives which complemented each other: a yearning for undoing certain agreements and modifying them and a need to establish a link with the system’s foundational moment in order to legitimise a new interpretation of the Constitution. Piqué’s ministerial style – which later on became more dramatic and abrupt – was characterised by this ambiguity. What causes me to think of Piqué is that Rajoy apparently sympathises with this style of doing politics avoiding face-to-face confrontation and, instead, trying to hold the inside line, to use a sporting analogy. Lest we forget that UCD, together with PSOE, was the driving force behind the Loapa, a bill which intended to downgrade the regional constitutions of Spain’s historic nations. Loapa’s music survived, even if the Constitutional Tribunal ruled against its lyrics.
The lesson learned by the new Popular leader is to avoid making some of Aznar’s mistakes. Rajoy does not want to produce more separatists, spark a Catalanist epic nor make too much noise. He wants to govern, to keep his post for as long as possible and, logically, to implement a programme which includes – pay attention to this – a not too obvious recentralisation of previously-devolved powers implemented with the help of the economic and social crises. This is why he is open to talk about regional financing with the Catalan government but tries to avoid the fiscal agreement which Convergencia i Unió demands and which has wide social support in Catalonia. Aznar’s absolute majority was an extolling of Agitprop, while Rajoy’s will be a methodical way of gaining ground subtly and discretely. Aznar was a ruler fascinated by the battle, while Rajoy is satisfied knowing that he is winning.
My prediction: Rajoy’s cabinet’s moves on the Catalan chess-board will be more sophisticated.